The political economy of labor market deregulation during IMF interventions by Reinsberg, Bernhard et al.
 The political economy of labor market deregulation during 
IMF interventions  
 
 
 
Bernhard Reinsberg1,2*, Thomas Stubbs2,3, Alexander Kentikelenis4, Lawrence King5  
1 – University of Glasgow, School of Social and Political Sciences 
2 – University of Cambridge, Centre for Business Research 
3 – Royal Holloway, University of London 
4 – Bocconi University  
5 – University of Massachusetts, Amherst  
 * Correspondence to: br385@cam.ac.uk, 12 Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1QA, United Kingdom 
 
 
Abstract: This study examines the relationship between policy interventions by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and de jure labor rights. Combining two novel datasets with unprecedented 
country-year coverage—leximetric data on labor laws and disaggregated data on IMF 
conditionality—our analysis of up to 70 developing countries from 1980 to 2014 demonstrates that 
IMF-mandated labor market policy measures significantly reduce both individual and collective 
labor rights. Once we control for the effect of labor market policy measures, however, we find that 
collective labor rights increase in the wake of IMF programs. We argue that this result is explained 
by the impact of union pressure on governments which, in such a context, are imbued with the 
policy space to respond to domestic interest groups. The study has broader theoretical implications 
as to when international organizations are effective in constraining governments’ choices. 
Keywords: International Monetary Fund; IMF program; labor rights; worker protection;  
JEL codes: F33, F34, F53 
 
Funding: Funding by the Cambridge Political Economy Society Trust and the Centre for Business Research 
at the Cambridge Judge Business School is gratefully acknowledged.   
Acknowledgements: We thank Simon Deakin, Sergiu Delcea, Timon Forster, Jonas Markgraf, Neil Yorke-
Smith, and participants of the Political Economy Research Group meeting at CEU Budapest (September 15, 
2017) for helpful comments. 
  
2 
Introduction 
Social scientists have long considered how free market policies have diffused around the world 
(Chorev 2005; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Meyer 
2000). These accounts have examined the global trend towards ever-greater economic 
liberalization, and elaborated on the underlying processes of learning, imitation or coercion that 
yield high degrees of policy homogeneity (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Lee and Strang 
2006; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Swank 2006). Among the key global forces promoting market 
liberalization, international financial institutions (IFIs)—like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the development banks—have been singled out as the world’s most powerful agents of 
economic reform (Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017; Stone 2011; Stone and Steinwand 2008). The 
lending activities of these organizations to developing countries have been linked to poor economic 
performance (Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher 2006), “hollowed-out” state capacity (Reinsberg et al. 
2018), and the dismantling of social policies (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Stubbs et al. 2018; 
Stubbs and Kentikelenis 2018b). 
Even though this free market revolution in the developing world has its roots in the 1980s (Babb 
and Kentikelenis 2018), the full range of its socio-economic consequences is only now beginning 
to become apparent. In this context, a growing strand of literature has explored the impact of IFIs 
on labor (Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015; Martin and Brady 2007; Nooruddin and Vreeland 
2010; Vreeland 2002). These organizations have notoriously sought to increase the “flexibility” of 
labor markets—that is, increasing employers’ ease in hiring, firing or regulating working hours 
(Burgess 2010, 202)—in borrowing countries with the promise of future economic growth.  
In this article, we elaborate on how IFI policies directly affect labor, with a focus on the lending 
activities of the IMF. We scrutinize the impact of IMF-mandated policies on labor rights. Previous 
scholarship has shown that labor rights are the most important labor issues, given their relationship 
with economic performance and human development (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002). Only few studies 
have focused specifically on the link between IMF programs and labor rights. Abouharb and 
Cingranelli (2007) measure collective worker rights for developing countries from 1981 to 2003 
and find that countries with more years under IMF programs have lower protection of worker 
rights. Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen (2015) use a panel of 123 countries from 1985 to 2002 to 
show that the cumulative years a country is under an IMF program has a negative impact on labor 
rights laws and practices. Finally, Gunaydin (2018) establishes that left-wing governments can use 
the Fund as a scapegoat to promote labor market reform. 
While these studies offer important insights on the links between IMF programs and labor rights, 
they contain some limitations. First, to date there are are no large-N cross-national statistical 
studies that cover different types of labor rights; for instance, collective labor rights (CLRs) include 
freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, whereas individual labor 
rights (ILRs) refer to legal protections against insecure employment relationships, overtime 
working, and unduly flexible hiring-and-firing procedures. Second, despite calls for disaggregated 
analyses of IMF conditionality (Vreeland 2007), quantitative studies tend to establish aggregate 
effects of IMF programs, hence treating such programs as homogenous and not distinguishing the 
mechanisms via which they affect labor rights. Recent works have addressed this lacuna, albeit 
incompletely. For instance, Rickard and Caraway (2018) created a new dataset on labor conditions, 
but focused on wages, rather than labor rights, as the outcome of interest. Gunaydin (2018) is the 
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first to examine labor conditions, but equates labor market reform with the degree to which 
borrowing countries comply with labor conditions, rather than tracing changes in labor laws. Third, 
and relatedly, previous studies do not directly attribute labor policy changes to IMF pressures. To 
some extent, this is because they focus on labor rights practices—rather than laws—which makes 
attribution more difficult as they are co-determined by an additional set of factors not under the 
control of the IMF.  
Why is understanding labor rights—and the balance between CLRs and ILRs—important? To be 
sure, there are often discrepancies between “law in books” and law in action (Pound 1910). 
However, the study of de jure rights offers meaningful insights because changes in practice are 
often preceded by changes in the law. Further, the distinction between CLRs and ILRs is important, 
as both can evolve in different ways. Lumping different types of labor rights together would thus 
be inappropriate. 
Our study advances these theoretical and empirical debates by examining the relationship between 
IMF programs and labor rights laws for a panel of developing countries between 1980 and 2014. 
Using a new dataset of labor rights laws (Adams et al. 2016), we distinguish between ILRs and 
CLRs. We also use a new dataset on IMF conditionality (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016) to 
capture the impact of the various types of policy reforms borrowing countries need to implement to 
access IMF credit. In line with expectations from international political economy scholarship 
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015; Stubbs and Kentikelenis 
2018a), we find that IMF labor conditionality exerts a significantly negative effect on both ILRs 
and CLRs. 
Our data also allows us to address a related puzzle in the literature—the co-evolution of declining 
ILR and increasing CLR during IMF programs when controlling for the effect of labor 
conditionality (Murillo and Schrank 2005). To resolve this puzzle, we develop a theory of labor 
regulation during IMF intervention, drawing on scholarship in comparative political economy. Our 
hypothesis is that the increase in CLRs is a result of lobbying efforts by organized labor, as unions 
seek higher CLRs for acquiescing to lower ILRs. As previous scholarship has emphasized, unions 
seek to maintain their own organizational relevance in times of economic trouble (Davidsson and 
Emmenegger 2013; Emmenegger et al. 2011; Schmitter and Streeck 1999). This allows them to 
prioritize the protection of those rights that benefit their own influence and members—if necessary, 
at the expense of workers more generally (Murillo and Schrank 2005). The empirical implication of 
our argument is that in the wake of IMF programs, ILRs decrease while CLRs may improve, 
especially when unions are more powerful, as under circumstances of high union density, frequent 
strikes, and high urbanization. 
In sum, our study contributes to long-standing scholarship on the links between globalized free 
markets and socio-economic rights (Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015; Blanton and Peksen 2016; 
Mosley and Uno 2007). First, while scholars have long examined the effects of globalization on 
economic policies, particularly domestic labor standards (Huber and Stephens 2001; Mosley and 
Uno 2007; Neumayer and De Soysa 2006; Rudra 2008), they have only recently become interested 
in the conditions of policy (non-)convergence (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Mosley 2008; 
Neilson and Stubbs 2016; Rudra and Haggard 2005). While these studies emphasize structural 
forces in the global economy as drivers of policy convergence, we shift attention to international 
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organizations—and the IMF in particular—as key agents of policy convergence, and show that 
IMF policy interventions can account for diverging labor rights.  
Second, by disaggregating the mechanisms through which IMF programs affect labor rights laws, 
we demonstrate how IFI pressures and domestic politics interact to generate labor policy reform 
outcomes. When IMF programs do not include labor conditions, labor rights are determined by 
domestic bargaining dynamics, as governments can legislate CLR increases to accommodate union 
pressure. Conversely, when IMF programs include labor conditions, government discretion is 
lower. Considering international pressures and domestic bargaining dynamics together, our study 
can help explain the puzzles that actual labor market reforms often differ from the IMF policy 
preferences and that some labor rights increase while others decrease during IMF interventions. 
Previous studies were unable to identify this mechanism as they used a binary indicator for IMF 
programs, obtaining a negative aggregate effect of such programs on labor rights.  
Third, owing to a lack of global data, most comparative political economy research focuses on 
economic policy-making in rich countries, and the ensuing arguments may not apply to the distinct 
institutional environments of developing countries. For instance, global market forces are more 
prominent for developing countries (Rudra 2002; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Wibbels and Arce 
2003), and international organizations have greater sway over domestic policy decisions. While our 
results confirm the important role of such global forces, they also suggest that core comparative 
political economy insights extend to developing countries, notably regarding the bargaining 
dynamics between governments and powerful interest groups. Our article hence addresses 
important knowledge gaps on the role of labor market institutions and domestic politics in 
developing countries. 
 
The relationship between IMF programs and labor rights 
The evolution of labor rights during IMF interventions 
There is near-consensus in the literature that the Fund has pushed governments to deregulate labor 
markets, oftentimes through explicit labor conditionality (Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015; 
Burgess 2010; Gunaydin 2018). A majority of IMF labor policy conditions target ILRs—the laws 
governing employment contracts, working conditions, and hiring-and-firing provisions (Burgess 
2010, 202). For example, an IMF staff report on Romania states: “[L]abor market rigidities are 
impediments to a business-friendly environment and Romania stands out compared with other 
countries, particularly on costs of hiring and firing workers” (IMF 2006, 29). The IMF has 
advocated similar conditions in other countries, promoting labor laws that legalize temporary work 
contracts, extend probation periods, and reduce the cost of firing workers (Caraway, Rickard, and 
Anner 2012, 33). Indeed, most Latin American governments have made changes to their laws 
governing hiring, firing, and work hours in the past twenty years as a result of IMF pressure 
(Burgess 2010, 214). When the IMF was called to rescue indebted countries in the midst of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, it asked for more flexible ILRs, specifically on firing provisions (Caraway 
2009, 161–62).  
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The Fund has also requested governments to reduce CLRs, albeit to a lesser extent than ILRs. 
CLRs pertain to organizing activity, collective bargaining, and strikes.1 IMF conditions have 
mandated the decentralization of collective bargaining, thus undermining the power of dominant 
unions (Burgess 2010, 213). For example, in its program with Macedonia, the IMF asked the 
government to “[a]mend the Law on the Chamber of Commerce to allow existing members of 
employers’ associations to terminate their membership prior to the negotiation of the next 
collective agreements” (IMF 2005, 59)—with the expected result being an increase in firms not 
bound by collective bargaining arrangements protecting workers’ rights. Labor conditions can also 
modify contractual provisions in the public sector (Nelson 1992, 229). While most of these 
conditions entail reductions in the public sector wage bill, some also affect pensions and other 
employee entitlements (Rickard and Caraway 2018).  
Do labor conditions in IMF programs affect labor regulations? In many cases of labor market 
reforms, it is possible to identify specific IMF-mandated labor policy conditions that precede such 
reforms, thus suggesting a causal impact of IMF intervention. But oftentimes the reforms that 
governments adopt differ from the IMF-mandated policy measures, leaving a puzzle to explain. 
Consider the example of Korea. In the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis, the country turned to the 
Fund for assistance and obtained a USD 21 billion stand-by credit line. Structural reforms of the 
Korean program included measures to “enlarge the scope for layoffs” alongside labor re-training 
measures and improved unemployment insurance (IMF 1998). Indeed, the Korean government 
relaxed the rules of dismissals. In particular, it extended employer discretion in employment 
adjustments to allow dismissals for managerial reasons and removing the requirement of prior court 
permission (Adams et al. 2016, 396). However, Korea simultaneously adopted measures implying 
significant CLR improvements. In particular, while lockouts were considered to be lawful as a 
retaliative measure to strikes, the revised CLR law states that lockouts must be reported to the 
relevant authorities in advance. Furthermore, the revised CLR code allows trade unions during a 
strike to be supported by an outside party, such as a union federation subject to notification to the 
relevant authorities (Adams et al. 2016, 398).  
The Fund did not prevent these legal changes resulting from government–union collusion. In a 
speech at Sogan University in January 1998, the IMF director for the Asia and Pacific region 
emphasized the role of the newly established tripartite committee in “produc[ing] a tripartite 
consensus” as to how to “distribute the burden of adjustment in a fair manner” (IMF 1998). The 
case of Korea seems to be no outlier. In many cases of IMF interventions, a characteristic 
combined pattern of declining ILRs and improving CLRs emerges, consistent with earlier 
qualitative studies (Caraway 2010; Cook 2007; Murillo and Schrank 2005). 
Theory and hypotheses 
How can one explain the co-occurrence of declining ILRs and increasing CLRs during IMF 
interventions? We argue this pattern is the outcome of the interplay between the government, the 
Fund, and organized labor. When devising labor policy, governments must consider competing 
interests, notably pro-deregulation IMF preferences and pro-regulation union interests. First and 
foremost, governments have incentives to adopt labor market reform in line with IMF policy 
                                                          
1
 CLRs should be distinguished from core labor standards—developed by the International Labor Organization 
and endorsed by the IMF—which outlaw child labor and all forms of forced labor, discrimination at the 
workplace, and repression of collective labor organization.  
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prescriptions because failure to do so may cause suspension of IMF credits and loss of IMF 
approval, which may lead to dwindling investor confidence, economic disruption, and government 
crisis. Consequently, the involvement of the Fund as an agent with free-market preferences shifts 
policy against the interests of labor. This is especially so when IMF programs include specific 
labor conditionality, in which case governments will have little policy space to forego these and 
related measures.  
Labor deregulation hypothesis: Labor conditionality decreases ILRs and CLRs. 
Yet, as Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen (2015, 327) argue, “[e]ven if labor issues are not explicitly 
addressed in the conditions of a given loan package, participation in IFI programs sends a clear 
signal to domestic groups, as well as to the global marketplace, that the recipient country is 
reforming its economy along the lines of the Washington consensus.” That is, governments 
dismantle barriers to global trade and capital, maintain restrictive monetary policy, and provide 
minimal regulation of businesses. This can have spillover effects on labor rights; and, indeed, some 
previous research shows a negative relationship between trade integration and labor rights (Mosley 
and Uno 2007). With regard to ILRs, we can thus formulate the following hypothesis. 
Market liberalization hypothesis: If a country is under an IMF program, controlling for the effect of 
labor conditionality, ILRs deteriorate. 
However, for CLRs, this is not where the story ends. Governments must also cater to powerful 
domestic interests, which generally oppose reductions in labor rights. Organized labor is a key 
interest group that opposes labor rights reductions and has significant leverage over government 
policy. For instance, organized labor can credibly threaten to punish the government for removing 
labor protections by withholding campaign contributions, initiating large-scale strikes, and 
mobilizing public protests. In many developing countries, the majority of employees work in the 
public sector, who are usually organized in unions (Haggard and Kaufman 1989, 224). As political 
economists have pointed out, the state-owned enterprise sector is “the lynchpin of a reputedly 
powerful coalition of beneficiaries with well-established claims to public resources” (Waterbury 
1992, 183). Governments therefore must be careful not to alienate public-sector workers through 
cuts in public expenditure, hiring freezes, and redundancies. 
The announcement of an IMF program signals to domestic constituencies that the government will 
reform its economy according to Washington Consensus prescriptions, potentially resulting in 
policy measures aimed at legalizing less secure forms of employment, reducing regulations of work 
conditions, and hiring-and-firing restrictions. Anticipating a reduction in labor rights as part of IMF 
programs, unions will thus mobilize against labor market reforms. However, unions—expecting to 
make at least some concessions in the negotiations over labor regulation—will strategically lobby 
for the types of labor protections that are most valuable to them.  
Unions have incentives to prioritize CLRs when lobbying governments because the gains from 
CLRs (unlike ILRs) are concentrated on organized workers, while costs of CLRs are relatively 
diffuse as they are distributed across employers, consumers, and taxpayers (Murillo and Schrank 
2005). In a similar vein, Davidsson and Emmenegger (2013) advance the argument that unions 
protect their organizational interests, notably by codirecting labor market policy reform, inasmuch 
as they seek to represent their members. In times of economic pressure, unions deemphasize short-
term interests, such as employment benefits to their individual members, while salvaging their 
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long-term interests, such as their ability to codetermine labor policy and work conditions. In other 
words, they prioritize long-term survival over short-term interests (Schmitter and Streeck 1999, 
54). 
Therefore, we expect unions lobby their governments for higher CLRs, while acquiescing to lower 
ILRs. Governments can readily accept this deal. For them, the cheapest way to obtain IMF credit 
while keeping unions at bay is to reduce ILRs—thereby following IMF requests to deregulate labor 
markets—and to simultaneously legislate improvements in CLRs—thereby accommodating labor 
unions and luring them into accepting the labor reform package. 
Union mobilization hypothesis: If a country is under an IMF program, controlling for the effect of 
labor conditionality, CLRs increase as a result of union pressure.  
Anecdotal evidence corroborates our theoretical argument. Consider the case of Korea, which 
witnessed a simultaneous reduction in ILRs and an increase in CLRs in the wake of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. Following a massive strike against the curtailing of ILRs in 1996, the Korean 
government revised the labor law again in 1997—primarily by providing guarantees for collective 
organization of unions and thus improving CLRs. Consistent with our argument, unions lobbied for 
CLR improvements, supported by organizations such as the OECD, which expressed concern about 
low CLRs—particularly the prohibition of unions for public servants, the prohibition of strikes for 
essential public industries, and the malfunctioning of the tripartite commission (Kim and Kim 
2003, 357–58). In sum, while the international financial institutions promoted ILR reductions, 
organized labor pushed for higher CLRs and succeeded in doing so. 
The Argentinean case provides further support for our argument (Cook 2007). In 1996, the Menem 
government agreed with the Fund to implement labor market reforms—including the lowering of 
severance pay, a prolonged probation period for new work contracts, and decentralization of 
collective bargaining. Some of these reforms “threatened core organizational interests such as 
union control over social welfare funds, contract terms in branch-level agreements, and the level at 
which collective agreements would be negotiated” (Cook 2007, 79). The major union—the 
Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT)—intensified its strikes and took the decrees to court, 
which deemed the collective bargaining reforms unconstitutional. After failing to deregulate labor 
by decree, Menem offered to work with the CGT on a new labor reform package, involving 
business associations in a consultative role. Negotiations lingered for another year until the 
government passed a new labor code in 1998—a mix of changes to several laws touching on both 
ILRs and CLRs. Some measures lowered employer costs by lowering some ILRs, for instance 
severance pay, but the government also abolished temporary contracts and reduced the probation 
period for new employees to one month (rather than following the IMF recommendation to set it at 
six months). In terms of CLRs, the law reaffirmed centralized collective bargaining, thus 
maintaining the chief role of CGT and protecting its organizational interests. Cook explained these 
compromises with the need for the government to fulfill its pledge vis-à-vis the Fund to issue a 
labor reform bill. However, the only way to comply with this deadline was to collaborate with the 
CGT, even though this produced an outcome that fell short of IMF expectations (Cook 2007, 80).  
Our theoretical argument has additional testable implications with respect to the relationship 
between IMF programs and labor rights. Therefore, we exploit variation in the strength of labor 
unions in borrowing countries. In particular, the effect of an IMF program on CLRs should be more 
positive in countries with more effectively organized labor interests. Indeed higher ‘potential labor 
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power’ is positively associated with increased social spending in democracies by helping workers 
better organize collectively (Rudra and Haggard 2005). Similarly, previous research focusing on 
state capacity has shown that “[i]n countries where the political representation of labor is likely to 
be strong—as a result of more democratic political systems, powerful left-wing political parties, or 
higher rates of union membership—[…] increases in state capacity will be associated with better 
protection of labor rights” (Berliner et al. 2015, 128). By the same logic, union mobilization will 
have stronger beneficial effects for labor rights—notably CLRs—as labor power increases.  
Labor power hypothesis: The CLR increase is stronger when labor is more powerful. 
 
Data and methods   
Labor rights data   
Our main dependent variable is the Center for Business Research LABOR REGULATION INDEX, 
which captures the extent of protection of labor rights for a wide range of countries over the period 
1970 to 2014. The data are based on the coding of 40 indicators based on primary legal documents 
in each country (Adams et al. 2016, 8). 
The sub-index for ILRs entails three sub-components: 
 Laws governing legal forms of employment (which types of contracts fall within the scope of 
regulation and how easy it is for employers to avoid worker-protective rules by adopting forms 
of work such as fixed-term employment, part-time work, and temporary agency work);   
 Laws on working time (safeguard rules which labor law inserts into the employment contract, 
including working time limits and those on overtime; minimum wage laws are not included); 
 Laws on dismissal protection (need to show good cause prior to dismissal and to observe due 
process in the termination decision, rules on probation periods, minimum notice periods, 
severance pay, notification of dismissals to third parties, and redundancy selection and priority in 
re-employment);  
The sub-index for CLRs consists of two sub-components: 
 Laws governing employee representation (constitutional guarantees of freedom of association 
and the right to collective bargaining, existence of duty to bargain on the part of the employer, 
rules governing closed shops, the extension of collective agreements, and codetermination at 
board level and in the workplace); 
 Laws relating to industrial action (extent to which collective industrial action is regulated by 
laws such as those on the constitutionality of strikes, unofficial strikes, political strikes, pre-
strike balloting and notice requirements, mandatory arbitration and conciliation, and dismissal 
and re-engagement of striking workers).   
The CBR dataset has several advantages over existing datasets. First, it offers more comprehensive 
coverage. For instance, the widely employed Mosley and Uno (2007) dataset, which is based on 
Kucera’s (2002) methodology, only includes the period 1985 to 2002; and the Cingranelli and 
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Richards (2010) dataset on worker rights ranges from 1981 to 2003. The dataset also covers both 
collective and individual labor rights, while previous global datasets cover the former. Second, by 
looking at the contents of labor laws across countries using a common coding protocol, the dataset 
focuses on de jure protections of labor rights. Most existing datasets focus on de facto labor rights, 
implying subjectivity in the ratings and a potential risk of mingling de jure rights and de facto 
protection that makes the resulting scores opaque. The few datasets that offer de jure rights data 
have less coverage than the CBR dataset. Although our focus on labor rights laws might be seen as 
a drawback, we argue that changes to them are a good predictor—if not a necessary condition—for 
significant changes in subsequent practices. Third, factor analysis confirms the presence of the 
posited five dimensions, showing high item correlation within each dimension and distinctiveness 
of items across dimensions.2 Coding decisions also are fully replicable given a comprehensive 
codebook justifying each coding decision by referencing the primary legal source. 
Our main analysis focuses on the two sub-indices, which we rescale to the range from 0 to 100 for 
ease of interpretation. In additional tests, we also use all five sub-components, each of them again 
rescaled to range from 0 to 100. 
IMF conditionality data  
Our key explanatory variables are based on the coding of IMF conditionality from all agreements 
between the Fund and its borrowers from 1980 to 2014 (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). This dataset 
offers a detailed account of all conditions over a range of issue areas. We expect that various IMF 
program components affect labor rights differently. Allowing for such effect heterogeneity, we 
employ several measures of IMF activity. 
First, we use a binary indicator for an IMF PROGRAM being active in a given year. If used jointly 
with measures of IMF conditionality, this variable captures all residual effects of IMF programs—
for instance, relating to Fund technical assistance. Second, we test for the impact of conditionality 
with a count for the number of LABOR CONDITIONS. We adopt a broad definition of labor 
conditions, referring to measures governing public-sector employment and private-sector work 
contracts. Examples of the former include requirements to enact “a law regulating dismissals of 
tenured public employees for inadequate performance and a constitutional amendment that 
establishes remuneration limits for public sector employees” (IMF 2000), while the latter may 
involve obligations to “pass a new labor code that facilitates work[ing] outside regular hours” (IMF 
2004). The supplemental appendix includes an extended list of cases. Following established 
procedure, we include a simple count of conditions while only considering binding conditions, 
which directly determine scheduled loan disbursements (Copelovitch 2010; Stubbs et al. 2017; 
Woo 2013).3  
Moderator variables 
To test the labor power hypothesis, we include an interaction term between the IMF variables and 
an indicator of labor power. Three alternative indicators are available: URBANIZATION, UNION 
DENSITY, and NUMBER OF STRIKES. In urban areas, workers find it easier to organize collectively 
                                                          
2 
Replication code for a confirmatory factor analysis is available.  
3
 The use of simple counts of IMF conditions—tantamount to assuming a linear effect between these conditions 
and labor rights laws—is consistent with established practice and reasonable because there is no natural order of 
importance of conditions.  
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due to higher population density and the prevalence of formal-sector jobs (Jones and Corbridge 
2010). We measure urbanization as the percentage of the population living in cities (World Bank 
2015). In addition, union density—the percentage of the workforce being union member—directly 
captures the organizational capacity of labor (Huber and Stephens 2001). Data are from the ILO 
industrial relations database (ILO 2017). Capturing de facto labor power, we compute the average 
number of strikes in the country over the 1980-2014 period, sourced from Databanks International 
(Banks and Wilson 2015). 
Control variables  
Since our preferred estimation includes fixed effects, we focus on time-varying variables. 
Following standard practice, we lag all control variables by one period to allow for some delay in 
their associated effects on labor rights laws. The supplemental appendix presents tables for 
summary statistics and detailed variable definitions and data sources for all variables. 
We control for standard macroeconomic factors that may influence the legal protection of worker 
rights but also IMF treatments. In particular, we include a measure of logged GDP PER CAPITA to 
capture the general level of development. This variable is highly correlated with variables capturing 
the structure of the economy, which are therefore omitted from the baseline specification. We also 
include the natural logarithm of POPULATION.  
Following the literature on the link between economic globalization and labor rights, we include 
two measures: TRADE OPENNESS—the logarithm of total trade flows (imports and exports) as a 
percentage of GDP—and logged FDI INFLOWS as a percentage of GDP. With respect to trade 
openness, previous studies expect a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ by which countries repress labor rights in 
order to maintain competitiveness in the global economy. In contrast, the ‘climb-to-the-top’ story 
suggests that countries improve their labor rights in order to attract foreign investors, assuming that 
these investors are interested in sustainable revenues (Rudra 2008).  
Changes in labor law may also be due to democratization (Caraway 2009; Kim and Kim 2003; 
Martin and Brady 2007), because democratic institutions facilitate collective mobilization for labor 
rights (Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015; Mosley and Uno 2007). At the same time, countries 
undergoing regime transition are more vulnerable to economic turmoil that lets them turn to the 
Fund (Haggard and Kaufman 1992). We therefore control for the POLITY IV index (Marshall, 
Jaggers, and Gurr 2010) measuring democratic institutions.  
Furthermore, the political ideology of the government may affect protection of labor rights due to 
different partisan preferences. Previous studies suggest that leftist governments are more 
responsive to labor movements and therefore are more likely to legally protect labor rights 
(Berliner et al. 2015; Peksen and Blanton 2016). We hence include a binary measure for LEFT-
WING GOVERNMENTS, drawn from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Another 
variable capturing preferences for labor protection is the dichotomous indicator ILO ratification, 
which measures whether a country had ratified core labor conventions—the Convention on the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (C087) and the Convention on the 
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (C098)—in a given year. While a positive 
relationship with labor rights laws might be expected, recent work argues that governments may 
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use the signing of these conventions strategically to conceal actual deterioration in labor rights 
(Peksen and Blanton 2016).4 
Finally, in the extreme event of civil war, states arguably are unable to adopt relevant legislation. 
We therefore include a binary measure of CIVIL WAR (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Blanton et 
al. 2015), based on the UCDP/PRIO definition of at least 25 battle deaths in a given year.   
In addition to these control variables, we include country fixed effects to account for time-invariant 
country-level characteristics, and year fixed effects to control for common external shocks across 
all countries. Past literature has varied with regard to the former. At least three papers include 
country fixed effects (Berliner et al. 2015; Cole 2013; Davies and Vadlamannati 2013), while many 
other studies (partially) pool observations and base inference on panel-corrected standard errors 
(Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009; Mosley and Uno 2007; Peksen and Blanton 2016). Since we 
are interested in explaining within-country variation in the protection of labor rights, we use fixed-
effects estimation.5 Due to missing values in the control variables, the panel dataset is unbalanced 
and includes up to 70 developing countries, with more observations being available in later years of 
the sample period.6 We also compute robust country-clustered standard errors to adjust for 
heterogeneity and serial correlation (Wooldridge 2002, 283).  
Econometric methods  
A key methodological challenge is that IMF programs and policy conditions may not be randomly 
assigned. To mitigate concerns about endogeneity, we estimate a system of equations including 
instrumental variables and allowing for correlated errors across equations (Roodman 2012). The 
simplest model (with only an IMF program dummy) involves two equations: one labor rights 
equation, and one equation on the determinants of IMF programs, with errors being connected 
through a cross-equation covariance parameter. This setup yields the same results as the 
conventionally used treatment effects model and hence serves to alleviate potential bias due to non-
random selection into IMF programs. When we test for the impact of conditionality, we estimate a 
system of three equations, including these two equations and another equation to account for the 
endogeneity of IMF conditions. This setup is advantageous for our purpose because it allows us to 
capture the effect of IMF programs without conditionality and the additional impact of IMF 
conditionality in a single model. Previous research—by limiting the sample to program years—
only identified the differential effect of IMF conditionality (Rickard and Caraway 2018), thereby 
being unable to estimate the overall effect of IMF policy interventions and potential dynamics 
beyond conditionality. In the following, we discuss the specifications of the auxiliary equations. 
First, we specify a selection model for IMF programs using a set of covariates used by previous 
literature. As past involvement of a country in IMF programs reliably predicts current participation 
(Bird, Hussain, and Joyce 2004; Conway 1994; Easterly 2005), we include PAST PROGRAMS—a 
count variable indicating the number of years during the past five years in which a country had an 
IMF program. In addition, program participation is also affected by the extent to which the Fund 
                                                          
4
 Results are unaffected by the inclusion of this variable. 
5 
A Hausman test also advises against using random-effects estimation. We also conducted augmented Dicky-
Fuller tests for stationarity, as well as the Wooldridge test for serial correlation, which both indicated no problems 
(1%-level of significance). 
6 
Without control variables, our analysis would be based on 114 countries. 
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has resources available, which depends on the current number of program countries (Vreeland 
2003, 88). Hence, we include the contemporaneous count variable COUNTRIES UNDER PROGRAMS. 
The literature also has repeatedly shown that allies of big powers receive favorable treatment by 
international financial institutions (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; Thacker 1999). We thus 
measure the alignment of voting patterns between the borrowing country and the G7 countries in 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA VOTE ALIGNMENT). We also include LEFT-WING 
GOVERNMENT, given that political ideology affects the propensity of a government to turn to the 
Fund. Legal origin—as it correlates with contemporaneous institutions—can also affect the 
likelihood of IMF programs; therefore, we include an indicator of COMMON LAW, as well as 
regional dummies, and year dummies.7 In robustness checks, we extend this list of covariates to 
include macroeconomic indicators—GDP per capita, economic growth, reserves in months of 
imports, current account balance—as well as the Polity IV index and an indicator for executive 
elections in a given year. These variables, which are all lagged one period further than the IMF 
dummy, are defined in the appendix. Note that at least one variable in this selection model should 
serve as exclusion restriction to reduce model dependence of our results. We argue that UNGA 
VOTE ALIGNMENT fulfills this criterion, because we do not see how geopolitics could directly affect 
labor conditions (conditional on other covariates included) other than through the propensity of 
obtaining IMF credit.8  
Second, we specify a model for IMF conditions to address their potential endogeneity. For 
instance, democratic governments with powerful domestic groups may have a better bargaining 
position with the Fund and hence obtain fewer labor conditions, especially if they face upcoming 
elections (Rickard and Caraway 2014). To mitigate potential endogeneity, we adopt an 
instrumental-variable design. An instrument is a variable that partially correlates with IMF 
conditionality but whose impact on labor rights only operates through conditionality. Finding such 
an excludable instrument presents a formidable challenge. We address potential endogeneity of 
conditionality by using an instrumentation strategy that has been popularized mainly in aid 
effectiveness research (Lang 2016; Nunn and Qian 2014; Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen 2009). For 
each type of condition, we construct a compound instrument based on the interaction of the within-
country average of these conditions and the annual number of countries under programs.  
We argue this instrumentation is valid. First, the instrument fulfils the relevance criterion because 
when the Fund assists more countries in any period, its resources are more stretched so that it 
assigns more conditions to any given country as a safeguard measure (Dreher and Vaubel 2004; 
Lang 2016; Vreeland 2003). Second, the instrument likely fulfills the exclusion restriction because 
country-specific changes in conditionality that deviate from its long-run average are brought about 
only by an IMF decision that does not pertain to the given country—notably to issue more 
conditions to all its borrowers when its resources are more demanded (Stubbs et al. 2018). 
Conditional on all other macroeconomic covariates included as control variables in our 
conditionality equation, we cannot think of any direct pathway from the IMF budget constraint to 
labor legislation other than through conditionality. While our solution is not perfect, we note that 
there are currently no satisfactory solutions to address potential endogeneity of conditions in 
                                                          
7
 Inclusion of country-fixed effects would create an incidental parameter problem. 
8
 A remaining possibility is that UNGA voting affects IMF conditionality. While this may be possible for the total 
number of conditions, it is not true for the number of labor conditions, which we verified in auxiliary regressions. 
Hence, this instrument fulfills the exclusion restriction. 
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general. We would be more confident in our findings though if we could show robustness to 
alternative choices on the time-varying component of the compound instrument. To that end, we 
use the IMF liquidity ratio in a robustness check (Lang 2016).  
 
Results  
Illustrative evidence  
We first explore the relationship between IMF programs and labor rights graphically. To that end, 
we split the sample into countries that were never exposed to IMF programs and countries with at 
least one program over the past 30 years. We then calculate the difference in labor rights for these 
two groups of countries. Figure 1 shows that countries with IMF programs experienced a decline in 
ILRs relative to non-program countries over the past 30 years (particularly in the early 1990s 
though). In contrast, no clear pattern emerges when comparing the evolution of CLRs across these 
two groups of countries.  
[Figure 1] 
Next, we graphically explore the impact of labor conditionality on labor rights. Here, we only 
consider countries with IMF programs but divide them according to whether or not they ever had a 
labor condition. Again, we calculate the difference between the two groups. Figure 2 illustrates that 
countries with exposure to labor conditions suffered from a gradual decline in their ILRs, while at 
the same time having increased their CLRs. Interestingly, the countries with labor conditions have 
slightly higher levels of labor rights (both ILRs and CLRs) to begin with than the reference group, 
but their trajectories diverge over time. Both graphs—while unable to establish causality—suggest 
a negative effect of IMF interventions (particularly labor conditions) on ILRs. 
[Figure 2] 
Multivariate analysis 
Table 1 allows us to untangle impacts of IMF labor conditions from other aspects of IMF programs 
on labor rights. In support of our hypothesis, we find that labor conditions reduce labor rights. In 
substantive terms, one additional labor condition reduces ILRs by more than seven points 
(p<0.05)—equivalent to half a standard deviation—and tends to reduce CLRs by 2.28 points 
(p<0.1). These effects need to be interpreted relative to the baseline scenario of the same country 
being under an IMF program but without labor conditions. For example, Bulgaria was under an 
IMF program in 1994 without a labor condition, implying predicted labor rights of ILR=63.0 and 
CLR=67.4. However, if it had been under a labor condition (as in 1997), predicted labor rights 
would have been ILR=55.5 and CLR=65.1 respectively.  
[Table 1] 
Table 1 also lets us consider the effect of IMF programs on labor rights in the absence of labor 
conditions. Then the respective term LABOR CONDITIONS drops out of the equation and the effect of 
interest is captured in the IMF PROGRAM variable. The results reveal a characteristic pattern 
whereby IMF programs are related to a significant reduction of ILRs but a significant increase in 
CLRs. Substantively, being under an IMF PROGRAM without labor conditions on average lowers 
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ILRs by 5.46 points (p<0.01), increases CLRs by 3.69 points (p<0.01), and has no significant 
impact on aggregate labor rights—compared to not being under an IMF program. Overall, the 
results lend strong support for our first two hypotheses, and we interpret these patterns as evidence 
of labor unions to prioritize collective bargaining rights over individual worker protection under 
heightened economic pressure. 
To test the labor power hypothesis, we conduct split-sample analyses using two proxies for the 
strength of organized labor. Table 2 shows the results using urbanization as proxy variable. Table 3 
shows the results using strikes incidence as proxy variable. In both cases, we find that the effect on 
CLRs of IMF programs with no labor conditions tends to be positive only in contexts in which 
labor is powerful. These findings provide evidence to suggest that governments must concede to 
labor to a larger extent when unions are more powerful and hence able to credibly threaten to 
disrupt the policy-making process. Where labor is more powerful, it can prevent CLR deterioration, 
thus corroborating our labor power hypothesis.  
[Table 2] 
[Table 3] 
Before probing the robustness of our results, we briefly discuss the adequacy of our model 
specifications. In the outcome equations, coefficients of control variables (if significant) have their 
expected signs. For instance, left-wing governments are associated with better protection of CLRs, 
while ratification of ILO conventions is negatively related with ILRs, broadly consistent with 
studies on ‘radical decoupling’ (Cole 2013; Cole and Ramirez 2013; Peksen and Blanton 2016). 
Furthermore, civil war negatively affects labor rights laws, consistent with prior expectations. As is 
common in fixed-effect models, slow-moving covariates remain statistically insignificant.  
In the selection model, we find evidence for recidivism given the statistically significant coefficient 
of past programs. Furthermore, countries allied to the major powers are more likely to receive IMF 
loans. Common law countries are less likely to turn to the IMF. Diagnostics for the above models 
indicate that our models are well-specified and fit the data reasonably well. 
Turning to the IMF labor conditions equation, we find the compound instrument to correlate 
strongly with the number of labor conditions. This shows that our instrument is relevant. The 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics imply a similar conclusion. In most cases, the size of the weak-
instrument bias is at most 10 percent of the endogeneity bias (Stock and Staiger 1997; Stock and 
Yogo 2005). To the extent that our compound instrument is excludable, our results also have a 
causal interpretation. Any potential remaining endogeneity bias would work against our posited 
effects because the IMF arguably would target countries with high levels of labor regulations, 
which—if uncorrected—would induce a positive correlation between IMF variables and labor 
rights. And yet, we find significantly negative effects, suggesting that labor conditions causally 
reduce de jure labor protection.  
Robustness checks 
We present additional robustness checks in the supplemental appendix and report on the results 
verbally due to space constraints. First, we choose a different set of control variables in the 
outcome equation—GDP per capita, GDP growth, trade openness, industry share in national 
output, labor force participation, Freedom House index, left-wing government, and ILO ratification 
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(Davies and Vadlamannati 2013)—which does not affect the main conclusions from the previous 
analysis but rather strengthens them.  
Next, we extend the set of control variables in the selection equation, including macroeconomic 
variables and political covariates. While we find the aggregate effects of IMF programs to be less 
significant, we corroborate that labor conditions reduce labor rights. In the selection model, 
indicators of economic weakness and democratic governance make IMF program participation 
more likely.  
In addition, we adopt a different instrumentation strategy and replace the time-varying component 
of the compound instrument. Lang (2016) uses as an instrument for IMF programs the interaction 
of the long-run propensity of a country to be under an IMF program with the IMF liquidity ratio—a 
measure of the availability of reserves to be loaned out to countries in need. We follow his 
approach and replace the number of countries under programs by the IMF liquidity ratio and the 
above interaction term in the selection equation. We also replace the instrument for IMF conditions 
by the long-run average number of conditions multiplied with the IMF liquidity ratio, arguing that 
the IMF will impose more conditions when its resources are stretched. The results lend even 
stronger support to our previous conclusions: IMF programs reduce ILRs but lead to an increase in 
CLRs, while labor conditions negatively affect labor rights indiscriminately.  
We also assess to what extent our results could be driven by reverse causality (which is only 
relevant if instruments are not valid). Theoretically, endogeneity may reflect a scenario in which 
IMF-mandated labor conditionality is sought after by governments rather than imposed by the 
organization. This kind of potential endogeneity does not affect any of our predictions. 
Governments with pro-labor preferences will have labor conditions imposed on them by the IMF, 
yet this will not preclude them from having to negotiate with unions. Reform-minded governments 
may not need labor conditions imposed, because their goals align with IMF preferences, but will 
still need to placate organized labor—although labor conditions may still be sought so that the 
Fund can be used as a ‘scapegoat’ to implement unpopular policy and weaken the bargaining 
power of unions (Gunaydin 2018). To test for reverse causality, we regress labor conditions on 
lagged labor rights, using two-way fixed-effects panel models with standard control variables. We 
also conduct (non-parametric) t-tests comparing labor rights across groups with varying exposure 
to IMF interventions. None of these tests indicates reverse causality.  
Finally, in the supplemental appendix, we also present additional analyses that lend further 
credibility to our results in at least three ways. First, we show that the negative effect on ILRs is 
due to more flexible firing and working time rules, while within CLRs, labor conditions affect 
employee representation. Second, we also find that de facto CLRs increase during IMF 
interventions, indicating that concessions to labor are not purely rhetorical. Third, by showing that 
labor force participation and the shadow economy are unaffected by IMF labor conditions, we 
dismiss the potential argument that IMF labor conditionality—while reducing labor rights for 
‘labor market insiders’—might help ‘labor market outsiders’ to get jobs in the formal economy.  
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Conclusion 
This article examined the potential impact of IMF policy reform programs on the legal protection 
of labor in developing countries. Extending earlier related work, our article offers new insights on 
this relationship by combining two new datasets with hitherto-unavailable level of detail, which 
jointly cover 117 countries and 35 years of observations. The labor rights data allow us to 
distinguish between individual labor rights—covering regulations on forms of employment, 
working time, and hiring and firing—and collective labor rights, such as the right to form unions, 
collective representation, and the right to strike.  
Theoretically, we expected a weakening of labor rights in the wake of IMF programs with specific 
labor policy conditionality because borrowing countries lack the policy space to circumvent such 
measures. In addition, we also expected that IMF interventions catalyze major resistance from 
organized labor, leading to labor rights improvements. We argued that unions—anticipating a 
deterioration of their privileges as a result of market-liberalizing policy reforms—lobby 
governments to increase CLRs for acquiescing to lower ILRs. Unions will prioritize CLRs because 
these rights benefit only organized labor, but costs associated with higher CLRs are distributed 
widely across society (Schrank and Murillo 2005). An empirical implication of this argument is 
that concessions to unions in the form of better CLRs should be strongest when organized labor is 
relatively powerful. 
Multivariate regression analysis for over 70 countries from 1980 to 2014—accounting for non-
random selection into IMF programs and potential endogeneity of labor conditions—corroborates 
our hypotheses. While the results show a positively significant residual impact of IMF programs 
(beyond labor conditions) on CLRs, we find this positive impact to be particularly pronounced in 
countries with high levels of urbanization and union density—two proxies for the organizational 
strength of labor—which further corroborates our argument. Our main result is robust against 
different measures, lag structures, and a variant of the instrumental variable. Yet, a limitation of our 
study is that quantitative data does not allow us to provide definitive evidence on the posited union 
mobilization hypothesis; follow-up case studies could bolster the argument by illustrating the 
mechanism in action. Another limitation is that our labor conditionality measure prevents us from 
assessing the extent of policy space reduction implied by such conditions; further disaggregation of 
the dataset would allow for such an assessment. 
These results have important implications for several key debates in social-scientific research. 
First, while previous research established that free-market policies undermine socio-economic 
rights (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015; Blanton and Peksen 
2016), our study demonstrates that IMF conditionality frequently includes measures requiring 
countries to reform rigid labor markets, and that these policy conditions effectively reduce labor 
rights. Second, our findings offer important lessons for compliance studies (Holzinger, Knill, and 
Sommerer 2008; Peksen and Blanton 2016; Simmons 2000). Policy convergence occurs only when 
external pressure eliminates policy discretion for borrowing governments, notably by explicitly 
including policy conditions to deregulate labor markets as a precondition for IMF loans. The 
explanation is straightforward: As labor market reforms are unpopular with governments for 
domestic reasons, the IMF must deploy labor conditionality to make countries adopt such reforms. 
Consequently, policy convergence is less likely when IMF programs do not explicitly require labor 
market deregulation. The effects of IMF programs without labor conditions are determined by 
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domestic politics rather than foreign pressures. Third, our political economy perspective also helps 
illuminate the puzzling co-occurrence of declining ILRs and growing CLRs during IMF programs 
(Murillo and Schrank 2005). 
Our findings also have ramifications for key domestic constituents. In particular, non-unionized 
labor has the most to lose when their government borrows from the IMF. Regardless of whether or 
not an IMF program includes labor conditionality, they can expect a blanket dismantling of their 
rights. For unionized labor, the waters are more muddied. When an IMF program includes labor 
conditionality, they can anticipate an improvement in their rights; however, given that around 70% 
of programs do not include labor conditionality, they too should be weary of their government 
entering an arrangement with the IMF, in which under most circumstances they can expect the 
same treatment as non-unionized labor. Businesses come out as clear winners in virtually all 
scenarios, as diminishing labor rights imply greater bargaining power for employers and—
consequently—the ability to pay workers even less. Furthermore, to the extent that unionized labor 
is concentrated in the public sector, employers may also be relatively unscathed by the domestic 
wrangles between organized labor and the government in IMF programs that do include labor 
conditionality. Nevertheless, this optimistic outlook for business must be tempered by evidence 
elsewhere showing the negative impact of IMF programs on economic growth (Dreher 2006). 
Our study has shown that IMF policy pressures over the past 30 years have reduced domestic labor 
rights, begging the question of whether the IMF has drawn the lessons from the past—for example 
by adopting a more labor-friendly policy stance in recent years. Indeed, the IMF now seems to 
recognize the importance of “designing labor market institutions so that they enhance flexibility 
while protecting workers” (Blanchard, Jaumotte, and Loungani 2013, 20); key economists within 
the IMF note that “greater flexibility can pose challenges for workers, especially those with low 
skills, and hence play an important role in explaining inequality developments” (Dabla-Norris et al. 
2015, 21). Further, the IMF has recently advocated social measures to remedy the impacts of 
deregulation. However, “the main focus of [its] policy recommendations regarding labor in Latin 
America has been the deregulation of labor markets, especially the rules governing hiring, firing, 
and work hours” (Burgess 2010, 215). Our data indicates no significant change in policy—albeit a 
change in rhetoric—which makes us skeptical about the scope for policy reform inside the IMF 
(Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016).  
Future research could further scrutinize other policy areas of IMF conditionality and their labor 
rights impact. Plausible arguments suggests that free-market conditionality beyond labor—for 
example relating to trade liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and financial 
sector liberalization—can adversely affect ILRs. However, as these policy conditions only 
indirectly affect labor rights, more research is necessary to identify conditions under which they 
unfold these effects. Research should also address the conditions under which IMF interventions 
are more or less effective. Our tests have produced results in line with the comparative politics 
literature showing that the strength of organized labor is a significant moderator of IMF pressure, 
but the insignificant findings on other domestic politics variables warrant further investigation.  
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Figures and tables 
 
Figure 1: The differential impact of IMF program exposure on labor rights in the developing world.  
 
Notes: The lines show the difference in the labor rights sub-index between countries that were under an IMF program and 
countries with no IMF program in the 1980-2014 period. 
Sources: CBR data (Adams et al. 2016) IMF conditionality database (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). 
 
Figure 2: The differential impact of IMF labor conditions exposure on labor rights. 
 
Notes: The lines show the difference in labor rights between IMF program countries with at least one labor condition and IMF 
countries without such condition over the 1980-2014 period.   
Sources: CBR data (Adams et al. 2016) and IMF conditionality database (Kentikelenis et al. 2016) 
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Table 1: The impact of labor conditions on labor regulation. 
Labor rights 
Labor rights 
index  
Individual 
labor rights 
Collective 
labor rights 
Labor conditions -4.46* -7.54** -2.28*   
 
(2.29) (3.75) (1.36)    
IMF program 1.56 -5.46*** 3.69*** 
 
(2.37) (1.70) (1.20)    
Log(GDP per capita) -0.86 -1.14 -2.46    
 
(2.95) (3.57) (2.16)    
Log(Population) -1.15 -3.09 0.45    
 
(5.50) (7.10) (5.56)    
Log(Trade openness) 0.69 0.78 0.70    
 
(0.85) (1.16) (0.91)    
Log(FDI inflows) 0.02 0.07 -0.00    
 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.13)    
Polity IV index 0.07 0.06 0.16    
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10)    
Left-wing government 1.42 1.22 1.55*   
 
(0.93) (1.30) (0.91)    
ILO ratification  -1.90 -3.55* -0.53    
 
(1.63) (1.93) (2.28)    
Civil war -3.13*** -3.32*** -2.92*** 
 
(0.75) (0.95) (1.11)    
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Labor conditions (auxiliary equation) 
  
                
Compound instrument 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Log(GDP per capita) -0.08 -0.09 -0.10    
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)    
Log(Population) -0.55** -0.52** -0.55**  
 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26)    
Log(Trade openness) -0.05 -0.04 -0.04    
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)    
Log(FDI inflows) 0.01 0.01 0.01    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Polity IV index 0.00 0.00 0.00    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Left-wing government 0.09 0.08 0.09    
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)    
ILO ratification -0.14* -0.16* -0.12    
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08)    
Civil war -0.08 -0.08 -0.08    
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)    
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
IMF program (auxiliary equation) 
  
                
Past programs 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Countries under programs 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
UNGA vote alignment 2.83*** 3.09*** 2.69*** 
 
(0.72) (0.70) (0.69)    
Left-wing government -0.06 -0.09 -0.08    
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(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)    
Common law -0.19* -0.22** -0.17*   
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)    
Region-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Within-R2 (Labor rights) 0.39 0.33 0.25 
Within-R2 (Labor conditions) 0.07 0.07 0.07 
F-statistic (Labor conditions) 14.73 13.04 15.37 
Pseudo-R2 (IMF program) 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Observations 1857 1857 1857 
Column headers show the labor rights index and its individual sub-indices. All covariates lagged by one period (covariates in the 
selection equation are twice-lagged). Each model contains three equations as indicated by row headers. Cross-equation correlation 
is explicitly taken into account. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels: * .1  ** .05  *** .01. 
 
 
Table 2: Split-sample analysis of IMF effectiveness by urbanization.  
 
 
Low urbanization High urbanization 
Labor rights 
Labor rights 
index  
Individual 
labor rights 
Collective 
labor rights 
Labor rights 
index  
Individual 
labor rights 
Collective 
labor rights 
Labor conditions 1.36 -0.04 3.96 -5.17*** -6.90** -1.65    
 
(4.90) (6.75) (4.87) (1.96) (2.83) (1.45)    
IMF program 4.67 0.17 3.54 0.82 -1.13 14.42*** 
 
(4.67) (.) (3.48) (1.85) (2.34) (5.53)    
Log(GDP per capita) 8.32** 8.00** 7.63** -5.78** -6.33* -2.95    
 
(3.27) (3.71) (3.60) (2.60) (3.34) (2.67)    
Log(Population) 14.28*** 12.34** 19.14** -9.89 -10.75 -4.54    
 
(4.85) (6.01) (7.97) (8.74) (11.53) (7.28)    
Log(Trade openness) 0.24 0.12 0.07 -1.45 -1.36 -1.36    
 
(1.23) (1.86) (1.12) (1.57) (2.16) (1.56)    
Log(FDI inflows) -0.20 -0.23 -0.15 0.11 0.25 -0.13    
 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.24) (0.29) (0.21)    
Polity IV index -0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.13 0.21    
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.21) (0.18)    
Left-wing government -0.35 -0.84 1.04 2.12 1.94 1.94*   
 
(0.85) (1.31) (0.94) (1.63) (2.30) (1.17)    
ILO ratification  1.45 1.26 0.88 -4.85* -6.64* -3.68    
 
(1.87) (2.43) (1.64) (2.93) (3.62) (3.03)    
Civil war -0.77 -1.12 -0.33 -4.34*** -4.79*** -3.07**  
 
(0.72) (0.87) (0.78) (0.91) (1.44) (1.26)    
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labor conditions (auxiliary equation) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IMF program (auxiliary equation) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within-R2 (Labor rights) 0.47 0.40 0.35 0.39 0.30 0.28 
Within-R2 (Labor conditions) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
F-statistic (Labor conditions) 5.04 5.02 5.02 8.25 8.16 8.14 
Pseudo-R2 (IMF program) 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Observations 635 635 635 1222 1222 1222 
Significance levels: * .1  ** .05  *** .01. 
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Table 3: Split-sample analysis of IMF effectiveness by strikes intensity.  
 
 
Low strike intensity High strike intensity 
Labor rights 
Labor rights 
index  
Individual 
labor rights 
Collective 
labor rights 
Labor rights 
index  
Individual 
labor rights 
Collective 
labor rights 
Labor conditions 0.45 -1.02 2.66 -4.19*** -5.90*** -1.41    
 
(3.06) (4.43) (3.38) (1.32) (1.88) (1.08)    
IMF program 1.03 -1.40 4.35 -0.52 -4.06 9.14**  
 
(3.67) (4.16) (3.90) (1.81) (3.54) (3.81)    
Log(GDP per capita) 2.63 3.48 1.40 -8.03** -8.53* -5.88    
 
(2.86) (4.08) (1.97) (3.48) (4.81) (4.40)    
Log(Population) 12.06*** 9.23 16.22*** -19.84** -21.26 -14.98**  
 
(4.46) (6.34) (4.34) (9.83) (13.91) (7.09)    
Log(Trade openness) 1.78** 1.76 1.78** 0.06 -0.08 0.19    
 
(0.87) (1.37) (0.86) (1.50) (2.37) (1.26)    
Log(FDI inflows) -0.08 -0.12 -0.02 0.07 0.22 -0.13    
 
(0.18) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.26) (0.20)    
Polity IV index 0.01 0.10 -0.13 0.07 -0.06 0.22    
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16)    
Left-wing government 2.90** 3.51** 1.77 0.31 -0.13 1.09    
 
(1.18) (1.55) (1.08) (1.34) (1.96) (0.94)    
ILO ratification  -2.41* -2.80 -2.01* 2.18 -2.87 9.25*** 
 
(1.41) (1.94) (1.17) (2.20) (3.15) (2.04)    
Civil war -3.42*** -5.39*** -0.52 -2.26*** -2.16*** -2.55*** 
 
(1.03) (2.04) (1.08) (0.68) (0.73) (0.98)    
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labor conditions (auxiliary equation) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IMF program (auxiliary equation) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within-R2 (Labor rights) 0.50 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.37 0.35 
Within-R2 (Labor conditions) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
F-statistic (Labor conditions) 3.38 3.39 3.61 13.48 13.48 13.43 
Pseudo-R2 (IMF program) 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Observations 860 860 860 997 997 997 
Significance levels: * .1  ** .05  *** .01. 
